Free adult sexting
Although we have yet to witness the prosecution of teenagers for scenarios that fall within the exemption’s parameters, or for consensual distribution that falls outside of these parameters, we have seen the development of numerous anti-sexting campaigns by police and child protection agencies which decry the very possibility of consensual and ‘safe sexting’, let alone the affordances of the practice as acknowledged by the Supreme Court [9,10].In this article, we argue against the construction of youths’ ‘risqué imagery’ as inherently risky and thus potentially subject to legal censure 6.Similarly, to equate queer sexuality with increased risk of harm relies on assumptions about the diseased and contaminating nature of that orientation and the sexual acts being engaged in.Heterosexuals, for instance, also practice anal sex in high numbers, whereas not all gay men do.Recognizing that the adjective risqué derives from the French , literally meaning ‘to risk’ 8, we nevertheless start from the position that “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality.But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (, p. We propose that extant frameworks, which conflate consensual and nonconsensual sexting and which equate both with negative risks that purportedly outweigh the value and benefits of the practice, rely on a calculus that is fundamentally flawed.
It is a way of representing events so that they may be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques, and for particular goals. In Part I, we map and trouble the way in which academic, police, and child protection responses to consensual teenage sexting emphasize the practice’s relationship to embodied risks (including mental, physical and sexual health and bodily integrity), financial risks (including ‘future prospects’), intimate risks (such as sexual assault and ruined reputation), and legal risks (including criminalization of minors and their parents) 9.In this article, we argue that these actors have erred in their construction of youths’ risqué imagery as inherently risky and thus governable.We propose that anti-sexting frameworks—which conflate consensual and nonconsensual sexting and which equate both with negative risks that purportedly outweigh the value and benefits of the practice—rely on a calculus that is fundamentally flawed. In Part I, we map and trouble the ways in which responses to consensual teenage sexting emphasize the practice’s relationship to embodied, financial, intimate and legal risks.It is a component of diverse forms of calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectives and populations” (, p. In Part II we assert that the risk regimes documented in the previous section act as a proxy for moralizing and thus governing youth sexuality [9,20,21,22], and suggest that any research examining sexting’s risks ought to consider additional and alternative variables and theoretical frameworks 10.In an effort to reconsider and resist the risk based moral regulation of adolescent sexual expression we reframe consensual teenage sexting through queer theorizations of temporality and futurity, in particular Judith Halberstam’s theorization of “queer time” and risk [23,24].We suggest that young people’s consensually created and distributed sexual imagery, including their distribution of imagery to those whom they are not in an intimate relationship with, poses little risk to children.We suggest that this warrants a reconsideration of Canadian crime prevention practices which, in essence, render the constitutionality of consensually self-produced and shared sexual imagery moot 7.Conversely, since the Supreme Court’s decision in , the purpose of which is to protect children from exploitation and abuse by prohibiting possession of material that presents a “reasoned risk of harm to children” . Thus, to remedy the law’s over breadth the court upheld the law’s constitutionality but determined that it must not be applied to two categories of material—minors’ “self-created, privately held expressive materials” and minors’ “private recordings that do not depict unlawful sexual activity” (, para. Indeed, the court went so far as to acknowledge that such imagery may be “of significance to adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization and sexual exploration and identity” (, para. As such, as long as youth consensually create and exchange sexual imagery with other minors with whom they are in an intimate and non-exploitative relationship, for their personal and private mutual enjoyment, such imagery ought to be constitutionally protected.When considering the dual concerns of protecting children and protecting free expression, Chief Justice Mc Lachlin, writing on behalf of the majority, found that prohibition against possession of child pornography “captures in its sweep materials that arguably pose little or no risk to children, and that deeply implicate the freedom [of expression] guaranteed under s. Despite the existence of this exemption, present day social, political, and extra/legal debates surrounding teenage sexting in Canada tend not to acknowledge the constitutionality of this subset of teenagers’ consensual sexual expression 5.While this claim is not completely unfounded , a survey of college-bound students conducted by Kaplan found that more than three-quarters of respondents said they would not be concerned if a college admissions officer Googled them .Part of this confidence had to do with youths’ increased online savviness and their attention to “strengthening privacy settings and circumventing searches [as demonstrated by the fact that] 22% had changed their searchable names on social media, 26% had untagged themselves from photos, and 12% had deleted their social media profiles altogether.” The study also acknowledged that such online searches might in fact be beneficial for youth if they “turn up postings of sports scores, awards, public performances or news of something interesting they’ve undertaken”  14.